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<text id=93HT0462>
<title>
1980: Kabul Is Not Saigon
</title>
<history>
TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1980 Highlights
</history>
<article>
<source>Time Magazine</source>
<hdr>
WORLD
Kabul Is Not Saigon
</hdr>
<body>
<p> Helicopter gunships blaze away at elusive guerrillas. The army
of a superpower tries to shore up an allied regime against an
insurgency, but the puppet government and its military forces
only grow weaker. The rebellion spreads. What was intended as
a swift surgical operation begins to resemble a futile, possibly
humiliating war without end.
</p>
<p> Ever since six Soviet divisions barreled into Afghanistan--and especially since the eruption of indigenous protests against
the invasion--Western analysts have been tantalized by possible
parallels to the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam. Says Viet Nam
War Chronicler David Halberstam: "The Soviets are learning the
big Viet Nam lesson, that it's easier to go into those countries
than it is to get out. They will find out, just as the U.S. did,
how amazingly easy it is for a little country to swallow a
military machine." Says a Pentagon officer with undisguised
delight: "I think it's great. It tickles me to death."
</p>
<p> There are some striking similarities. Like the U.S., the
Soviets moved in first with advisers, then felt compelled to
undertake an active military role when the country was on the
verge of collapse, as Viet Nam was in 1965. Just as the U.S.
did with South Viet Nam's forces, the Soviets inherited a
demoralized, poorly trained, desertion-prone Afghan army that
has not stomach or heart for fighting the Muslim insurgents.
Meanwhile, the rebels show no sign of melting away before the
overwhelming firepower of Soviet tanks, artillery and supersonic
fighter-bombers. The Moscow installed government of President
Babrak Karmal already appears to be as discredited as Nguyen Van
Thieu ever was in Saigon. Even the explanations for the
invasion that Soviet officials are giving out in Moscow have a
lamely defensive, Viet Nam-era ring: "We had no choice. We
had to live up to our commitments."
</p>
<p> Some of the problems the Soviets face in Afghanistan are even
more troublesome than those the U.S. tried to cope with in Viet
Nam. Despite their discontents, the South Vietnamese populace
did not actively rise up against the Saigon government; by
contrast it appears that the vast majority of the fierce and
volatile Afghans seem to reject the Kabul regime. Edmund
Stillman, a strategic analyst who is the director of a
Paris-based think tank, the Hudson Institute, points out that
Afghanistan is in roughly the same category of population as
South Viet Nam (approximately 16 million, vs. 12 million) but
is four times larger in surface area. "If South Viet Nam could
not be held by 1 million local forces plus 540,000 U.S. troops,"
Stillman says, "it is hardly credible that a vastly larger
Afghanistan can be pacified by a dubiously loyal army of 40,000
and a mere 100,000 Soviets." He also believes that Moscow's
forces--like America's in Viet Nam--face a problem of
technological overkill: "What are they going to do, napalm
nomad tents?"
</p>
<p> For all the similarities, however, there are significant,
perhaps crucial, differences. First, the logistical equation
is almost exactly reversed; the Soviets are operating across and
adjoining land border, not across 7,000 miles of ocean. In the
Afghanistan war, it is the insurgents who are to a degree
stranded, cut off from sources of support. Second, unlike the
Viet Cong, the Afghan rebels are lightly armed and disunited,
with neither a Ho Chi Minh to galvanize them ideologically nor
anything like the North Vietnamese army to back them up
militarily. Finally, there is a quantum difference on the home
front: no network TV news brings the bloody facts of the war
home to the average Soviet citizen, there are no antiwar
movements on Soviet campuses, no antidraft demonstrations, no
domestic public opinion to limit the options of the leadership.
</p>
</body>
</article>
</text>